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I. INTRODUCTION
Reconciling the interrelationship between patent and antitrust law
has long been a topic of concern to courts as well as to commentators.
Antitrust law and intellectual property law are generally seen as being in
conflict.1 Patent law is concerned with the creation and commercial
exploitation of a statutory grant of monopoly power while antitrust law is
concerned with proscribing various kinds of monopoly power. The Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals and has decided cases in which patent law and antitrust law have
intersected. Recent cases decided by the Federal Circuit have raised
serious questions regarding the potential bias created toward patent rights
†
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1
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203-05 (2d Cir. 1981)
(summarizing the conflict between intellectual property law and antitrust law) (“The
conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they embrace that
were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws proscribe
unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the inventor with a
temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive exploitation of his patented
art.”).
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when crossed with antitrust restraints. Concerns were raised when the
Federal Circuit developed its own interpretation of antitrust laws instead
of applying regional circuits’ interpretation of antitrust laws when
antitrust counterclaims are raised in patent litigation.2 A related concern
is whether the Federal Circuit is exercising the role envisioned by
Congress. With equal importance, the patent and antitrust laws are
complementary and serve the public in different ways.
This paper will argue that the Federal Circuit is correctly balancing
the competing policies behind antitrust and intellectual property by
applying its own choice-of-law rules when deciding whether patent
litigation brought for the sole purpose of inflicting an anticompetitive
injury can be the basis of antitrust liability. The Federal Circuit’s
expansive interpretation of its jurisdiction over antitrust claims is
appropriate and strikes a proper balance between patent law and antitrust
law. This jurisdictional expansion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
precedent, Congress’s vision of uniformity, and the balance between
patent law and antitrust law. The Federal Circuit has narrowed the
choice-of-law to be applied when deciding antitrust issues in the patent
enforcement context consistent with a proper balance of patent and
antitrust laws. The difficulty which might arise from narrowing the
choice-of-law rule is de minimis when compared to a more stable and
uniform patent law and antitrust interplay. Finally, the Federal Circuit’s
controversial decisions involving the intersection of patent law with
antitrust law demonstrate the Federal Circuit’s ability to strike a proper
balance between the two related and complementary areas.
Section I of this paper will provide an overview of how the Federal
Circuit was created and the cases that have developed the scope of the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. This section will demonstrate that the
Federal Circuit may properly expand its jurisdiction into particular
antitrust issues and remain within the jurisdictional scope intended by
Congress. Section II will discuss the development of the Federal
Circuit’s choice-of-law rules and cases that have expanded the scope of
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to apply to non-patent cases. Section III
will analyze the choice-of-law principles and the implications of
deciding antitrust counterclaims particularly after the Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc.3 decision. Section IV will demonstrate the
practicality and sensibility of the Federal Circuit’s application of its own
2
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Challenges of the New
Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Remarks
Before the American Antitrust Institute (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov./
speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm) [hereinafter “Pitofsky Remarks”].
3
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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law when deciding antitrust counterclaims and the consistency with
Congress’s vision of the role of this court.
II. THE EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S JURISDICTION OVER
CERTAIN ANTITRUST ISSUES
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of and jurisdictional expansion over
antitrust claims settle the confusing split of authority Congress attempted
to combat when it created the Federal Circuit. Therefore, a discussion of
the reasons for the existence of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is
germane. Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to solidify the
varying lines of patent law that were developing among the district
courts. According to legislative history, the purpose of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 19824 was to create a forum that would “increase
doctrinal stability in the field of patent law.”5 The Federal Court
Improvement Act of 1982 sought “to reduce the widespread lack of
uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the
administration of patent law” by creating the Federal Circuit to hear
appeals and set binding precedent in patent cases.6 The general
jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit has been to apply its own substantive
law to patent issues and the appropriate regional circuit law to non-patent
issues.7
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution says that Congress
shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”8 Congress
thus gave inventors the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention, without the consent of the patent owner, for a
period of time.9 Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to increase uniformity in patent law and to free the
judicial process from forum shopping caused by conflicting patent
4

28 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West Supp. 2005).
The evidence compiled “singled out patent law as an area in which the application
of the law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms
in substantially similar cases. Furthermore, in a Commission survey of practitioners, the
patent bar indicated that the uncertainty created by the lack of a national law precedent
was a significant problem . . . .” S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (footnote omitted), as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
6
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981)). Panduit includes an extensive discussion
of the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.
7
Id. at 1573.
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
5
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decisions of the regional circuits. Congress’s objectives in creating a
Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain patent cases were
“to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal
doctrine that existed in the administration of patent law.”10 Congress has
stated that cases will be “within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise
under’ federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction.”11
The jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), provides that where
the jurisdiction of the district courts is based “in whole or in part, on
section 1338 of this title,” the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals from the final decisions of those district courts.12
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the district courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.” Further, district courts have original
jurisdiction over civil actions asserting unfair competition claims “when
joined with a substantial and related” patent, trademark, or copyright
claim.13 The Federal Circuit thus has exclusive power to review final
decisions in cases where the jurisdiction was based at least in part on a
claim arising under the patent laws.
Commentators have argued that the phrase “based, in whole or in
part, on section 1338,” could support several types of jurisdiction.14
However, the Supreme Court in Christianson v. Colt Industries
10

Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 813 (1988) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981)).
11
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981).
12
28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) provides:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of
the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of
this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of
Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or
trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a) shall be governed by
sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.
13
28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(b) (West Supp. 2005).
14
See Judge Jon O. Newman, Tails and Dogs: Patent and Antitrust Appeals in the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 10 APLA Q.J. 237, 238-39 (1982). Judge
Newman summarized three basic approaches to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction as (1)
the traditional “arising under” jurisdiction if the claim (but likely not a defense) in the
district court arose under the patent laws, (2) “case” jurisdiction where the entire case is
appealable to the Federal Circuit if there was a patent issue in the case, regardless of
whether the issue was raised as a defense or claim, and (3) “issue” jurisdiction where
only the patent issue is appealable to the Federal Circuit while the remaining issues for
appeal are heard by the applicable regional circuit.
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Operating Corp.,15 limited the Federal Circuit’s broad appellate
jurisdiction by applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. The plaintiff in
Christianson brought an antitrust action alleging a concerted refusal to
deal, i.e. monopolization and the restrain on trade in the relevant
market.16 The defendant argued that any refusal to deal was justified
under state trade secret law.17 However, the plaintiff anticipated this
defense and included in its claim that the trade secrets were
unenforceable since the secrets should have been disclosed in the
defendant’s patents.18 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the Federal Circuit,
which in turn transferred the appeal to the Seventh Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1631 because the case did not arise under the patent laws.19 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that Federal Circuit
jurisdiction turns on whether the case arises under a federal patent
statute.20 The Court further explained that Federal Circuit jurisdiction
extends only to those cases where there is a well-pleaded complaint
which establishes that either the cause of action or the right to relief
depends on federal patent law.21 The Court reasoned that if the claim did
not “arise under” the patent laws then the Federal Circuit lacks
jurisdiction to decide the antitrust issue.22 In other words, the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction extends “only to those cases in which a wellpleaded complaint” confers jurisdiction in the district court.23 Jurisdiction
thus extends only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law.24 Therefore, Federal Circuit
jurisdiction cannot be conferred when the defense of federal question is
raised and is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint.
15

486 U.S. 800, 807-13 (1988).
Id. at 804. Christianson alleged a number of theories and courses of conduct by
which Colt had monopolized and restrained trade in the market for parts for the M16
rifle.
17
Id. at 805-06.
18
Id. at 806.
19
Id. at 818. The Federal Circuit is, by this transfer statute, limited to a choice
between two simple alternatives once it found it lacked jurisdiction. The court is to
dismiss the case or transfer the case to a court of appeals that has jurisdiction. A court
may not extend its jurisdiction where none exists, even in the interest of justice. See Vink
v. Schijf, 839 F.2d 676 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d
515 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
20
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807.
21
Id. at 807-12.
22
Id. at 809.
23
Id.
24
Id.
16

312

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:307

Christianson teaches that a court must look to the elements of the
claims appearing on the face of the complaint and must determine
whether patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims. A district court must therefore ascertain whether all the theories
by which a plaintiff could prevail on a claim rely solely on resolving a
substantial question of federal patent law. The Federal Circuit has stated
that, under Christianson, a claim supported by alternative theories in the
complaint may not form the jurisdictional basis unless patent law is
essential to each theory.25
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision that Federal Circuit
jurisdiction extends “only to those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint” confers jurisdiction in the district court, the Federal Circuit
has not interpreted its jurisdiction so narrowly. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit anticipated the Supreme Court’s decision in Christianson when it
decided Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.26 In that case, the Federal
Circuit concluded that its appellate jurisdiction must be determined by
reference to whether a claim in the underlying case “arises under” the
patent statute.27 In Atari, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Congress
designed the Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction “over appeals from
decisions in ‘cases’ in which the district court’s jurisdiction ‘was based,
in whole or in part, on Section 1338.’”28 Therefore, a case in the district
court involving patent law and antitrust issues must be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, even if the patent issues were already resolved in the
district court and the only issue remaining is the antitrust claim or if the
non-patent claims are tried separately in the district court and appealed
without the patent claims.29 For example, in Korody-Colyer Corp. v.
General Motors Corp.,30 the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction to hear an
appeal of a Walker Process claim31 after previously affirming a judgment
that invalidated the patent. The Federal Circuit thus hears antitrust claims
that would otherwise be heard by regional courts of appeals by broadly
25

American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (citing Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810).
26
747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
27
Id. at 1431-32.
28
Id. at 1429.
29
See id.
30
828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
31
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965). As explained by the Supreme Court in Walker Process:
The enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be
violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to
a § 2 case are present. In such event, the treble damage provisions of § 4 of
the Clayton Act would be available to an injured party.
Id. at 174.
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interpreting its appellate jurisdiction. However, the court recognizes that
“increased uniformity in the substantive law of patents does not require
that this court get its hands on every appeal involving an allegation that a
patent law issue is somehow involved.”32
After Christianson, the Federal Circuit extended the well-pleaded
complaint rule to include well-pleaded compulsory counterclaims. In
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 33
the defendant raised a compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement
when the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of no misappropriation
of trade secrets. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal in
cases where the complaint was based on diversity and a compulsory
counterclaim for patent infringement was present.34 The court reasoned
that to hold that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction when a well-pleaded
patent infringement claim is the basis of a pleading labeled “complaint”
but not when the same well-pleaded claim is the basis of a pleading
labeled “counterclaim” would seem incongruous.35 The right to file a
counterclaim for patent infringement is unique to patent law and thus
warrants a uniform national rule for the Federal Circuit to determine.36 In
other words, it would be irrational to distinguish between complaints and
counterclaims when determining the direction of an appeal to the Federal
Circuit when the counterclaim arises under the patent laws.37 The Federal
Circuit has concluded that a defendant may direct the appeal to the
Federal Circuit by asserting a patent counterclaim, regardless of the
claims in the complaint. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over entire cases.38 Therefore, cases involving the patent laws are
appealed to the Federal Circuit and the direction of appeal to the Federal
Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the only issues
remaining are not within its exclusive assignment. In cases involving
both patent and non-patent claims, the court has jurisdiction over the
non-patent claims as well as the patent claims. This is in order to avoid
creating fresh opportunities for forum shopping, to avoid bifurcation of
issues and cases at trial and on appeal, to remove uncertainty and the
32

Atari, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1429.
895 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
34
Id. at 745.
35
Id. at 742.
36
See Vivid Techs. Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The court did not decide what the result would be in the event the counterclaim was only
permissive.
37
Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 742.
38
See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 832 n.3
(2002) (reaffirming that the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction is over the entire case,
not just patent issues on appeal).
33
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abuses of procedural maneuvering, and to facilitate resolution of
disputes.39
The Federal Circuit’s extension of the well-pleaded complaint rule
to include compulsory counterclaims is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Christianson. The Supreme Court has stated that a
court may not extend its jurisdiction where none exists, even in the
interest of justice.40 The Federal Circuit strictly construes its jurisdiction
in harmony with its congressional mandate. Like all other federal
appellate courts, the Federal Circuit is a legislative creation, deriving its
power solely from a statutory mandate with limited jurisdiction.41 All
federal courts have the duty to examine and determine their own
jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has inherent jurisdiction, as do all
appellate courts, to determine its own jurisdiction and that of the tribunal
from which the appeal was taken. The Federal Circuit’s AeroJet-General
Corp. decision recognizes that the lack of appellate subject matter
jurisdiction is a defect in the court’s authority to act and thus the case
should be either dismissed or transferred to a court of appeals that does
have jurisdiction.42 As the Aerojet-General Corp. court stated, “Congress
anticipated the need for interpretation of [the Federal Circuit’s]
jurisdictional mandate.”43 Acting within congressional mandate, the
Federal Circuit may recharacterize pleadings that would improperly
evade the intent of Congress. As the court noted, “the mere labeling and
sequencing of pleadings in the trial tribunal cannot be allowed to control
every exercise of this court’s appellate jurisdiction.”44
It would clearly evade the intent of Congress and would clearly be
irrational for the court to distinguish between complaints and
counterclaims when considering the appropriate appellate path for patent
claims. All courts have the duty to determine that an appeal is properly
before it and the Federal Circuit shares this determination as well. The
Supreme Court recognized this duty when it stated that the
“determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgment
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.”45 The
Federal Circuit will follow the law as interpreted by the circuit in which
the district court is located; however, such deference is inappropriate on
issues of the Federal Circuit’s own jurisdiction. Unlike other courts, the
39

Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1435-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 803 (1988).
Id.
42
Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 739 n.5.
43
Id. at 739 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981)).
44
Id. at 740.
45
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 n.2 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)).
40
41
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Federal Circuit does not have supervisory authority over district courts
and may not reassign a case to another district judge, despite allegations
of bias.46 Congress clearly intended for the Federal Circuit to hear wellpleaded and non-frivolous patent law claims, both complaints and
counterclaims, which arise under the patent laws, in order to maximize
the court’s ability of achieving congressional objectives.47 Therefore,
there is no conflict between a proper application of the Supreme Court’s
well-pleaded complaint rule articulated in Christianson and the Federal
Circuit’s determination that it “has appellate jurisdiction when a nonfrivolous well-pleaded compulsory patent law counterclaim is present in
a case originally and properly filed in the district court.”48 The expansion
of the scope of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to cover antitrust issues
is consistent with Congress’s vision, Supreme Court precedent, and the
balance between patent law and antitrust law.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
Before Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,49 the general
jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit had been to apply its own
substantive law to patent issues and the appropriate regional circuit law
to non-patent issues. The Federal Circuit recognized that its exercise of
jurisdiction over non-patent issues might result in the type of appellate
forum shopping with which Congress was concerned. Many patent
infringement suits involve antitrust issues which arise either in the
context of patent misuse defenses or direct claims and counterclaims for
violation of federal antitrust laws. In order to minimize forum shopping,
the Federal Circuit applies the law of the “involved circuit” to issues
which it normally has no jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district courts are
obligated to “follow the guidance of their particular circuits” in all except
those issues where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.50 For
example, in Atari, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed its
patent. The district court enjoined the defendant from contributory
copyright infringement in connection with the defendant’s sale of ink
cartridges. The defendant appealed the copyright injunction to the
Federal Circuit, which applied the law of the involved circuit to the issue

46

See Peterson Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“We do not sit to judge the character of district court judges.”).
47
See Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 744.
48
Id. at 741.
49
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
50
Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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because it was one which “normally possesses no jurisdiction.”51 The
Federal Circuit recognized that district courts would be obligated to
follow the guidance of their regional circuits in all but the substantive
issues assigned exclusively to the Federal Circuit.
The court further applied this rule when it decided Cygnus
Therapeutics Systems v. Alza Corp. by applying regional circuit law to
the antitrust claim before it.52 In Cygnus, a competitor alleged that a
patent holder had violated antitrust laws and sought a declaratory
judgment on the patent’s validity and enforceability. Alza owned a patent
that stood as a roadblock in the way of the marketing and production of
Cygnus’s product.53 Cygnus alleged a Walker Process claim54 against
Alza asserting that Alza procured its patent through “deliberate fraud on
the Patent Office” by misrepresenting prior art, which enabled Alza to
obtain a patent which in turn stifled competition.55 The Federal Court
affirmed the district court’s decision and found that Alza did not enforce
its patent in an anti-competitive manner.56 In determining whether the
district court correctly decided the issue in favor of Alza on Cygnus’s
Walker Process claim, the Federal Circuit applied the law of the regional
circuit in which the district court sits.57 In general, therefore, the Federal
Circuit would approach a federal antitrust claim as would the regional
court of appeals for the circuit that includes the district court whose
judgment is being reviewed.58
The Federal Circuit was cautious in its treatment of choice-of-law
issues and generally avoided its discussion by merely deferring to the
regional circuits. The choice-of-law rule articulated in Atari and applied
in Cygnus was a prophylactic principle applied to prevent litigators from
the forum shopping Congress envisioned. In order to minimize a constant
transfer of appeals, and accordingly the amount of forum shopping, the
51

Id. at 1436 n.12 (citing S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982)).
92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d
861, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We must approach a federal antitrust claim as would a court
of appeals in the circuit of the district court whose judgment we review.”).
53
Cygnus, 92 F.3d at 1160.
54
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
55
Cygnus, 92 F.3d at 1162.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1161 (“We must approach a federal antitrust claim as would a court of
appeals in the circuit of the district court whose judgment we review.” (citing Loctite
Corp., 781 F.2d at 875)). The court, in Cygnus, followed Ninth Circuit precedent on this
issue. In the Ninth Circuit, “[w]ithout some effort at enforcement, the patent cannot serve
as the foundation of a monopolization case.” Cal. E. Lab., Inc. v. Gould, 896 F.2d 400,
403 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court dismissal of a Walker Process claim where
the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant “actually attempted to enforce the patents”).
58
Loctite Corp., 781 F.2d at 875.
52
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Federal Circuit followed the guidance of the circuit court involved.
Without the application of the Atari choice-of-law rule, litigants would
have an opportunity to forum shop by providing an escape from the law
of the involved circuit.
The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was changed after
Nobelpharma was decided. Atari and Cygnus were overruled and the
Federal Circuit no longer turned to the regional circuits for guidance with
regard to all non-patent issues. After Nobelpharma, certain antitrust
issues were decided without the guidance of regional circuit precedent.
The Federal Circuit limited its own choice-of-law rules relating to certain
antitrust issues. The court decided for the first time that “all antitrust
claims premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit” would
now be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law, even though
antitrust law is not within its exclusive jurisdiction.59 Thus, in deciding
whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a
patentee of its immunity from antitrust laws, Federal Circuit law
applies.60 This new choice-of-law rule applies to all antitrust claims
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit.61 In
Nobelpharma, the patentee, Nobelpharma AB (“Nobelpharma”), brought
an action for infringement of its dental implant patent against Implant
Innovations, Inc. (“Implant”). Implant counterclaimed for antitrust
violations based on the assertions that Nobelpharma attempted to enforce
a patent it knew was invalid and unenforceable.62 The district court
found that Nobelpharma did not have a valid patent and thus allowed the
jury to hear only Implant’s antitrust counterclaim.63 The jury found that
Nobelpharma’s patent was obtained through fraud on the Patent Office,
that Nobelpharma knew that its patent was fraudulently obtained when it
commenced the infringement action against Implant, and that
Nobelpharma brought the infringement suit to intentionally interfere with
Implant’s competition in the relevant market.64 The district court thus
held Nobelpharma liable for violating the antitrust laws.

59

1998).
60

Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 1062.
63
Id. at 1063. Nobelpharma’s patent was invalid for failure to disclose the best mode
when it did not list a 1977 publication as a reference. Id. at 1062. The evidence at trial led
the court to believe that the inventor possessed a preferred method of making the claimed
invention and failed to disclose it sufficiently to enable those skilled in the art to practice
that method, as required by the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1065.
64
Id. at 1063.
61
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Judge Laurie recognized case law
precedent holding that when reviewing a district court’s judgment
involving federal antitrust law, the Federal Circuit should be guided by
the law of the regional circuit in which that district court sits.65 However,
the Federal Circuit chose to overrule its precedent and held that “whether
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee
of its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of
Federal Circuit Law.”66 The court explained that an antitrust claim
premised on stripping a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws
is typically raised as a counterclaim by a defendant in a patent
infringement suit and are frequently appealed to the Federal Circuit.67
Judge Laurie continued by stating that the Federal Circuit was “in the
best position to create a uniform body of federal law on this subject and
thereby avoid the ‘danger of confusion [that] might be enhanced if this
court were to embark on an effort to interpret the laws’ of the regional
circuits,” and that this rule was to be applied to all antitrust claims
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit.68 The application
of the Federal Circuit’s own law is limited, however, and when issues
involving other elements of antitrust law which are not unique to patent
law, such as relevant market, market power, and damages, the laws of the
regional circuits are still applied.69 Therefore, in deciding whether
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee
of its immunity from the antitrust laws, Federal Circuit law applies.70
This conclusion applies equally to all antitrust claims premised on the
bringing of a patent infringement suit.71 The Nobelpharma court
therefore provided a clear test for defining what conduct tips the balance
from inequitable conduct to fraud such that the patentee is stripped of his
or her immunity from antitrust liability.

65

Id. at 1067 (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
66
Id. at 1068 (“Accordingly, we hereby change our precedent and hold that whether
conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity
from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.”).
67
Id. at 1067-68.
68
Id. at 1068 (citing Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
69
See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed Cir. 2000)
(applying regional circuit law when evaluating conduct with respect to copyrighted
diagnostic software). See also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e should abandon our practice of applying regional circuit
law in resolving questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal
and state law rights. Henceforth, we will apply our own law to such questions.”).
70
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068.
71
Id.
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The Federal Circuit had two reasons for ruling that infringement
based antitrust lawsuits are to be decided as a matter of Federal Circuit
law. First, most patent-related antitrust issues are counterclaims to
infringement actions and will be appealed to the Federal Circuit
anyway.72 Second, the court recognized that it is in the best position to
create a uniform body of federal law on the subject of patent-related
antitrust issues.73 In deciding Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit provided
guidance for the analysis of patent misconduct affecting antitrust issues.
By taking patent-related antitrust issues into its subject matter
jurisdiction, the court provided coherence to the current debate on the
proper balance between patent and antitrust law.74 Although it may seem
strange for a federal district court judge not to be governed by the
precedents of his or her own circuit court of appeals on antitrust issues,
Congress intended this situation in the interest of promoting a uniform
patent law.
By having only the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decide
questions on antitrust claims premised on the bringing of a patent
infringement suit, Congress’s vision is preserved. It is within Congress’s
vision to have patent issues decided by a court in the best position to
create a uniform body of law. Nobelpharma is defensible because patent
and antitrust laws are complementary – the patent system encourages
invention and the bringing of new products to the market by adjusting
investment risk; antitrust laws foster industrial competition.75
Furthermore, the court pledged to continue applying the appropriate
regional circuit law to antitrust issues that were not deemed related to the
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction (issues not unique to patent
law).76 The Federal Circuit’s decision to apply its own law to antitrust
cases arising from infringement suits was motivated by the court’s intent
to clarify federal jurisdiction over issues related to patent law.
Nobelpharma creates a consistent jurisdictional authority over mixed
cases of civil and patent law. Consistent jurisdictional authority will in
turn lead to a uniform body of law. In conclusion, the Federal Circuit
attempted to provide coherence to patent-related antitrust issues by
providing guidance for the analysis of patent misconduct affecting
antitrust issues and taking such cases into its subject matter jurisdiction.
72

Id. at 1067-68.
Id.
See Deirdre L. Conley, Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209 (1999), for an analysis on how the Federal Circuit addressed
the antitrust-patent relationship by providing a clear test to determine whether a patent
owner should be stripped of antitrust immunity.
75
ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 688-89 (5th ed. 2001).
76
See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068.
73
74
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The court’s Nobelpharma choice-of-law rule would serve the policy
goals of Congress in enacting the Federal Courts Improvement Act,
specifically, predictability in the patent laws through the creation of a
uniform body of law.77 The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule
articulated in Nobelpharma is necessary for the development of a
uniform body of patent law.
IV. STABILITY AND UNIFORMITY IN THE PATENT AND ANTITRUST
INTERPLAY
It has been argued that the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule
“creates an unmanageable outcome because the court now applies its
own law to issues that arise in cases over which it does not have
exclusive jurisdiction.”78 For example, a district court faced with
conflicting appellate authority with respect to the same issue must decide
whether the appeal will be taken to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
or a regional circuit court of appeals to determine which law to apply.
This difficulty may be illustrated by comparing the Supreme Court’s
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (“Kodak I”)79
decision with the Federal Circuit’s In re Independent Service
Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”)80 decision and the Ninth
Circuit’s Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak
II”)81 decision.
The Federal Circuit articulated the circumstances in which a patent
holder may be held liable for violating the antitrust laws when exercising
its patent rights in the Xerox decision.82 In Xerox, the antitrust plaintiff
accused Xerox of refusing to sell its patented parts to independent
service organizations that were competing to service and maintain Xerox
copiers. The plaintiff claimed that Xerox’s conduct would eliminate
competition in the service markets since the independent service
organizations were being denied access to certain patented parts. The
plaintiff alleged Xerox was violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
the defendant counterclaimed for patent infringement.83 The Federal
Circuit reconfirmed its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
77

Id. at 1068 (citing Forman v. United States, 767 F.2d 875, 880 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
78
Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust
Law for the Whole Country?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 699 (2002).
79
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
80
203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox
Corp., 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
81
125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997).
82
Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1326.
83
Id. at 1324.
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restrictions antitrust law places on a patentee’s exercise of its patent
rights.84 The court stated that the issue of “whether conduct in procuring
or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from
the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.”85
The court then enumerated the circumstances in which a patent holder
may be held liable for antitrust violations. First, a patentee may be held
liable if “the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Corp.”86 Second, the patentee may be held liable if an
infringement suit was instituted and “the infringement suit was a mere
sham to cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”87 Third, if the
patent was used as a “tie” to extend market power beyond the patent
grant (illegal tying), then the patent owner may be held liable.88 The
court further stated that in the absence of any indication of illegal tying,
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent
holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the
antitrust laws.89 The court refused to inquire into the patentee’s
subjective motivation for exerting his patent rights, “even though his
refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an
anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not
illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant.”90
The Federal Circuit chose to protect Xerox’s patent rights despite
any anticompetitive conduct the antitrust plaintiffs were willing to show.
The court held that Xerox’s conduct was not, as a matter of law, a
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After this case, a patentee is
essentially immune from antitrust liability for refusal to deal unless the
antitrust plaintiff can show that (1) the patent was obtained by fraud on
the Patent & Trademark Office (Walker Process-type claim); (2) the suit
by the patentee was a “sham” as defined by Professional Real Estate

84
85

1068).

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1325 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,

86
Id. at 1326 (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 177).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1327.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1327-28. The Federal Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s
rebuttal-presumption rule that a patentee’s exercise of its statutory right to exclude others
from using its work is a presumptively valid business justification that may be overcome
by looking to the subjective intent of the patent holder.
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Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”)91; or (3) the
patent was used as a “tie” to extend market power beyond the patent
grant. It is important to note that as required by the rule in Nobelpharma,
the court applied its own law when it decided whether the refusal to
license or sell patented parts constituted a violation of the antitrust laws.
However, when the court evaluated that conduct with respect to
copyrighted diagnostic software, it applied regional circuit law, since
copyright law is not within the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court addressed the patent holder’s refusal to deal
when it decided Kodak I, prior to the Federal Circuit’s Xerox decision.92
In Kodak I, a manufacturer had a policy which limited the availability of
replacement parts for its equipment which made it difficult for
independent service organizations to compete. The independent service
organizations brought an antitrust suit against the manufacturer. The
Supreme Court noted that a patent holder could refuse to license, but
such refusal was subject to a rebuttal presumption that refusing to license
was harmful to consumers.93 The Court stated in a footnote that even if a
manufacturer possesses “some inherent market power in the parts
market, it is not clear why that should immunize them from the antitrust
laws in another market.”94 This proposition was given a narrow
interpretation by the Federal Circuit’s Xerox case where the court
essentially held that a monopolist’s mere refusal to license will be upheld
regardless of the subjective motivation of the patentee. The Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand, has given this proposition a relatively broad
interpretation when it decided Kodak II,95 on remand.
91

508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
93
Id. at 458.
94
Id. at 479 n.29. Footnote 29 states that:
[E]ven assuming, despite the absence of any proof from the dissent, that all
manufacturers possess some inherent market power in the parts market, it is
not clear why that should immunize them from the antitrust laws in another
market. . . power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a
patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller
exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the
next.’
Id. At the time, however, intellectual property rights were not an issue before the court.
See Jonathan Gleklen, Antitrust Liability for Unilateral Refusal to License Intellectual
Property: Xerox and its Critics 6 (Spring 2001) (unpublished manuscript, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020501gleklen.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 1005))
(“[F]ootnote 29 can be characterized as dicta because the Kodak case did not involve the
rights of intellectual property owners — the only evidence before the Court was that none
of Kodak’s parts were patented.”).
95
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir.
1997).
92
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In Kodak II, a group of independent service organizations (“ISOs”)
challenged Eastman Kodak’s practice of refusing to sell patented parts
for its copiers to ISOs servicing its copiers.96 The ISOs claimed that
Eastman Kodak leveraged “its monopoly over Kodak parts to gain or
attempt to gain a monopoly over the service of Kodak equipment,” in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.97 The Ninth Circuit stated that
“‘exploit[ing] [a] dominant position in one market to expand [the] empire
into the next’ is broad enough to cover monopoly leveraging under
Section 2.”98 The court further stated that “[n]either the aims of
intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask
anticompetitive conduct.”99 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, the
presumption of a valid business justification in refusing to license in
order to exclude others from patented work may be rebutted by evidence
of pretext, such as a showing of the monopolist’s state of mind or
subjective motivations. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s
footnote 29 in Kodak I when it decided this case. Footnote 29 of Kodak I
states that “power gained through some natural and legal advantage such
as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next.’”100 However, intellectual property rights were not at issue
before the Court in Kodak II because the defendant had not raised it.101
Therefore, the footnote on which the Ninth Circuit relied when it decided
Kodak II could be characterized as dicta.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Xerox simply reaffirmed the
principle that a patent owner has the right to grant exclusive or
nonexclusive licenses or to sue for infringement without placing a
restraint on trade. The grant of an exclusive license is a lawful incident of
the right to exclude provided by the patent laws and a patent owner has
the right to exclude and select its licensees. Patent owners do not have to
license the use of their inventions.102 This principle conforms to a
fundamental principle of antitrust law that companies are allowed to
unilaterally choose with whom they want to conduct business.103 The
96

Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1208.
98
Id. at 1216 (quoting Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479 n. 29).
99
Id. at 1219 (citing Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 484).
100
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29
(citations omitted).
101
See Gleklen, supra note 94 (manuscript at 6).
102
35 U.S.C.A. § 271(d)(4) (West Supp. 2005); Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
Bag. Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
103
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
97
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Xerox court correctly rewarded innovators by imposing antitrust liability
only when the conduct in question is based on improperly seeking to
expand on otherwise valid patent rights or when the conduct is based on
an invalid patent claim. Because Xerox was decided in favor of the
patentee, some in the antitrust community have perceived the court as
giving undue deference to the principles of patent law. The former
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, Robert Pitofsky, expressed
concern that recent cases have “upset the traditional balance in a way that
has disturbing implications for the future of antitrust in high-technology
industries.”104 However, it should be noted that the Federal Circuit
sustained the district court’s antitrust verdict in Nobelpharma and did not
find in favor of the patentee.105
Another commentator has suggested that the Xerox decision
expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to antitrust law, where
Congress never intended the Federal Circuit to have influence.106
Notwithstanding the commentary of some noted antitrust scholars and
practitioners,107 Xerox correctly draws the line between patent law and
antitrust law. The respect that antitrust laws have towards the protection
afforded to patents by the Constitution and the patent laws is
demonstrated in Xerox.108 However, Section 2 of the Sherman Act may
104
See Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of
Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 919 (2001); see also Robert
Pitofsky, Speech Before the Antitrust and Technology Conference, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy (Berkley Ctr.
L. & Tech., Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Cal., Mar. 2, 2001), in 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535,
545-46 (Spring 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/ipf301.htm
[hereinafter “Pitofsky Speech”].
105
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
106
See Ronald S. Katz & Adam J. Safer, In Ruling on Antitrust, Does Federal Circuit
Overstep?, 10/16/2000 NAT’L L.J. C20 (2000), http://www.mw-law.com/3.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005).
107
See James B. Kobak, Jr., The Federal Circuit as a Competition Law Court, 83 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 527 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Circuit has taken a
grudging view of antitrust principles and a broad view of patent rights) at
http://www.aipla.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=659; Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual?
The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2000); see also Ronald Katz &
Adam J. Safer, Should One Patent Court Be Making Antitrust Law for the Whole
Country? 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 700 (2002); James B. Gambrell, The Evolving Interplay
of Patent Rights and Antitrust Restraints in the Federal Circuit, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
137 (2001).
108
See David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in
Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (2001) for a discussion and analysis on how the Federal
Circuit correctly articulated the safety zone for the use of valid patents when it decided
Xerox; See also Peter M. Boyle, Penelope M. Lister & J. Clayton Everett, Jr., Antitrust
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prohibit a firm from unilaterally refusing to license their patent rights
where such a refusal would allow the firm to obtain or maintain
monopoly power by excluding competition in a way that does not benefit
consumers.109 It is conceded that substantial antitrust claims were
intended to be decided by regional courts of appeals under their
governing legal interpretations, however a patent holder’s antitrust
immunity is not stripped, according to the Federal Circuit, unless the
conduct involves one of the three specific and limited patent-antitrust
issues articulated in Nobelpharma, particularly when a party has asserted
a Walker Process claim, a sham litigation claim, and/or an illegal tying
arrangement.110 These issues are limited to when patent law issues need
to be balanced. Furthermore, when the Federal Circuit applies its own
law with regard to this patent-antitrust intersection, it limits itself and
applies the regional circuit’s jurisprudence when analyzing the traditional
elements of antitrust violations under the Sherman Act.111
Therefore, although there may be conflicting authority on the same
issues, depending on where an appeal will be brought, district courts
need not despair. The Federal Circuit was given the authority and
responsibility of adjudicating patent issues. A district court must adhere
to Federal Circuit precedent in interpreting and applying patent law. At
the same time, a district court is also required to respect the authority of
its regional circuit court when interpreting non-patent specific issues.
Because patent law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Law at the Federal Circuit: Red Light or Green Light at the IP-Antitrust Intersection?,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 739 (2002); See also Simpson v. United Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13
(1964), where the Supreme Court addressed the tensions between the patent and antitrust
laws and explained that, in the event of a conflict, the patent laws control.
109
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29
(1992) (“Even assuming, despite the absence of any proof from the dissent, that all
manufacturers possess some inherent market power in the parts market, it is not clear
why that should immunize them from the antitrust laws in another market.”).
110
In Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit enumerated the circumstances in which a
patent holder may be held liable for an antitrust violation. First, the court stated that a
patentee may be held liable “if the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and
willful fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp.” Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068. Second, the patentee may be held liable if an
infringement suit was instituted and “the infringement suit was a mere sham to cover
what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor.” Id. Third, if the patent was used as a “tie” to extend
market power beyond the patent grant (illegal tying), then the patent owner may be held
liable. Id. See also Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
111
In further response to the proposition that the Federal Circuit will appropriate for
itself elements of federal or state law, attorneys practicing in the Federal Circuit must
proceed with caution as they must argue and brief many other issues as if they were
appearing before the regional court of appeals for the circuit in which the case originated.
Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Circuit, and the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari, Nobelpharma
is the rule of law. The application of the Federal Circuit’s Nobelpharma
choice-of-law rule offers consistency and uniformity when addressing
the issue of what conduct in procuring or enforcing a patent causes the
patent owner to lose its immunity to antitrust laws. In reality, the district
courts need not conduct a balance between patent and antitrust laws in
order to determine which circuit courts’ law to apply – Nobelpharma
articulates only three specific patent infringement-antitrust issues in
which antitrust immunity is stripped from the patentee.112
Congress sought to advance a clear, stable, and uniform basis for
evaluating matters of patent validity and infringement so as to render a
more predictable outcome of contemplated litigation, to facilitate more
effective business planning, and to add confidence to investments in
innovation and technology.113 As illustrated by the above cases that offer
a mix of antitrust and patent claims, the predictability of the outcome
may be problematic. However a strong adherence to the Federal Circuit’s
jurisdictional mandate articulated in Nobelpharma should lead to a more
consistent patent infringement-antitrust jurisprudence.
The Federal Circuit’s broad approach articulated in Xerox has been
criticized by the former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert
Pitfosky, who stated that the Federal Circuit has unduly expanded the
intellectual property grant.114 However, many commentators agree with
the Federal Circuit’s approach and view the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II
decision as relying too much on the principles of antitrust law as opposed
to intellectual property law.115 Xerox is correctly decided because the
112

See supra note 110.
See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d
736, 744 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. 97-312, at 20 (1981)), which provides:
The establishment of a single court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly
singled out by the witnesses who appeared before the Committee as one of
the most far-reaching reforms that could be made to strengthen the United
States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation. The new Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit will
provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in
patent litigation more predictable and will eliminate the expensive, timeconsuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the
field.
See also Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 744 n.7 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3-6
(1981)), which noted that “[t]he committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction
over patent claims of the new Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is
intended to alleviate the serious problems of forum shopping among the regional’s [sic]
courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of
appeals.”
114
Pitofsky Speech, supra note 104, at 545-46.
115
See, e.g., Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co.: Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual Property
113
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Federal Circuit rewards innovators by imposing antitrust liability only
when the conduct in question is based on an invalid patent claim or
improperly seeks to expand on otherwise valid patent rights. The court’s
limitations on imposing antitrust liability in the patent context are
consistent with the long-standing relationship between antitrust and
patent laws. The Ninth Circuit’s decision indeed limits a patentee from
exercising patent rights if exercising it leads to a monopoly in a market
for a product not claimed in the patent. However, in analyzing whether
Kodak’s patent rights conferred upon it the right to exercise market
power in the services market, the Ninth Circuit compared the literal
scope of the patent claims with the scope of the relevant antitrust market
to determine whether the economic market fell within the scope of the
patent grant.116 On the other hand, the Federal Circuit focused on
whether the patentee’s conduct fell within the scope of the patent grant,
rather than the effects flowing from the conduct.117 In other words, under
Xerox, “a patent may properly confer market power in multiple economic
markets” so long as the patentee does nothing more than exclude another
from making, using or selling a patented invention.118 The Federal
Circuit’s approach seems to reflect a more realistic view of the
relationship between a patent and the markets in which it creates power.
A patent defines the scope of an invention and should not stand for the
definition of a particular relevant market, thus the antitrust laws should
not align patent rights into a particular relevant market. The Xerox case
correctly demonstrates how the antitrust laws respect the long-standing
protections afforded to intellectual property by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution and the patent laws. The difficulty which may arise from the
Federal Circuit’s Nobelpharma choice-of-law rule is de minimis in view
of a more stable and uniform patent law and antitrust law interplay.
V. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S TREATMENT OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS IN THE
PATENT INFRINGEMENT CONTEXT
There has been concern regarding how well the Federal Circuit has
handled situations in which antitrust principles and patent law have
intersected.119 Recently-decided cases have raised questions regarding a
possible bias created when patent rights and antitrust restraints cross
paths. Some of this concern arises because antitrust development is being
Rights and Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471 (1999); See generally
Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 108.
116
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d 1195, 1215-17 (9th Cir. 1997).
117
Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
118
See Boyle et al., supra note 108, at 755 n.68 (citing Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327).
119
Gambrell, supra note 107, at 148.
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addressed by the protectors of intellectual property rights, the Federal
Circuit. However, the Federal Circuit does not overreach its authority
when it decides antitrust issues as they relate to patent enforcement
because it does so in a well-balanced manner consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and the role envisioned by Congress.120
Most of the Federal Circuit’s encounters with antitrust issues
involve either a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity or
counterclaims to patent infringement suits.121 These issues usually
involve an accused patent infringer alleging antitrust violations in a
counterclaim or a plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment of patent
invalidity based on fraud procured on the Patent Office.122 A defendant
may also raise a sham litigation claim alleging that a patentee is
involving the courts to enforce its patent rights.123 Federal Circuit Judge
Lourie in Nobelpharma stated:
A patentee who brings an infringement suit may be subject to
antitrust liability for the anti-competitive effects of that suit if the
alleged infringer (the antitrust plaintiff) proves (1) that the
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful fraud
within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp., or (2) that the infringement suit
was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.”124

Because Nobelpharma cited to Supreme Court holdings when it
mandated that Federal Circuit law applies to antitrust issues related to
patent enforcement, it is important to briefly discuss the cases which
have been the basis for the development of antitrust jurisprudence in the
Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit has remained faithful to the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &

120

Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 108, at 109.
See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd, 895
F.2d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
when the only patent claim is a non-frivolous compulsory counterclaim); DSC
Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction when the only patent claim is a nonfrivolous permissive counterclaim).
122
See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 895 F.2d at 745; DSC Commc’ns, 170 F.3d at 135859.
123
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
124
Id. (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 144 (1961)) (citation omitted).
121
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Chemical Corp.125 and PRE126 when it examined antitrust issues in the
patent enforcement context. The Supreme Court addressed antitrust law
as it related to inequitable and fraudulent conduct before the Patent
Office when it decided Walker Process.127 In PRE, the Supreme Court
discussed sham litigation. The Court concluded that the fraudulent
procurement and enforcement of a patent may be subject to a Walker
Process-type claim.128 The bad faith enforcement of a patent known to be
invalid or not infringed may be subject to a sham litigation claim.129
Most antitrust claims in patent-related litigation are grounded upon these
Walker Process and sham litigation claims.130
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,131 the Supreme Court decided that the enforcement of a patent
which had been procured by fraud on the Patent Office may violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, so long as the other elements necessary to
prove a Section 2 violation were also present.132 In Walker Process, the
patent holder, Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. (“Food Machinery”)
brought an infringement action against Walker Process Equipment, Inc.
(“Walker Process”).133 Walker Process counterclaimed alleging that Food
Machinery had fraudulently procured and enforced a patent, and,
accordingly, illegally monopolized interstate and foreign commerce in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.134 The Supreme Court decided
in favor of Walker Process and for the first time held that enforcement of
a fraudulently procured patent could give rise to antitrust liability.135 The
antitrust liability of Walker Process is summarized as follows: an entity
that defrauds the Patent Office should not be afforded the Constitutional
protections of Article I, Section 8, and the patent laws in general.136 If
those protections are lifted, the entity’s conduct may then be scrutinized
under the Sherman Act. Walker Process requires the antitrust plaintiff

125

382 U.S. 172 (1965).
508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
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See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
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See id.
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See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
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RICHARD G. SCHNEIDER, THE ANTITRUST COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 50 (Elizabeth Benton, et al. eds., American Bar Association
1994).
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382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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Under such circumstances, an injured party would be able to collect treble
damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 2005).
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Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 173.
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Id. at 174.
135
Id. at 177.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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(infringement defendant) to show fraud on the Patent Office as well as all
the requirements for a Section 2 violation of the Sherman Act.137
Under the choice-of-law rule articulated in Nobelpharma, the
Federal Circuit’s law applies when deciding “[w]hether conduct in the
prosecution of a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity
from the antitrust laws.”138 Consequently, Federal Circuit precedent
governs the analysis of the fraud-on-the-Patent Office aspect of Walker
Process antitrust claims.139 In analyzing fraud on the Patent Office
relating to omissions or misrepresentations, the fact omitted or
misrepresented must be “‘the efficient, inducing, and proximate cause, or
the determining ground’ of the action taken in reliance thereon.”140 The
antitrust plaintiff (infringement defendant) must prove by clear and
convincing evidence141 that the patentee committed fraud on the Patent
Office when the patentee knowingly and willfully made a fraudulent
omission and/or misrepresentation with a clear intent to deceive the
patent examiner (intent element) and that the misrepresentation and/or
omission was the “efficient, inducing, and proximate cause, or the
determining ground” of the issuance of the patent, in other words, “the
patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission”
(materiality element).142
The Supreme Court stated that:
[A] patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest
[and it] is an exception to the general rule against monopolies
and to the right to access to a free and open market. The far
reaching social and economic consequences of a patent,
therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or

137
138

1998).
139

Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78.
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir.

Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1070 (quoting 37 C.J.S. FRAUD § 18 (1943)).
141
See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1984).
142
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-71. Once the antitrust plaintiff raises sufficient
questions of fact with regard to the Walker Process fraud elements of intent and
materiality, the traditional elements of Section 2 violations of the Sherman Act must also
be met. Since the traditional elements of Section 2 violations of the Sherman Act do not
involve the patent laws, the Federal Circuit still follows the laws developed in the
regional circuits when determining whether or not the antitrust defendant should be held
liable.
140
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other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope.”143

Patent owners must therefore be permitted to test the validity of their
patents in court through actions against alleged infringers.144 To avoid
violations of the Sherman Act,145 patent holders must use care not to
exceed the limits of power contemplated by Congress when it enacted
the Patent Act.146 Patent owners must not use their patent rights as “a
sword to eviscerate competition unfairly” otherwise they may become
liable for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the relevant
market is present.147 Therefore, a patent holder who enforces a
fraudulently procured patent, uses patents to demand unreasonable patent
licensing agreements, or brings “bad faith or sham enforcements of
patents, may incur antitrust liability under Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman
Act.”148 It is appropriate for the Federal Circuit to have exclusive
jurisdiction over the antitrust claims presented by Walker Process claims
because the facts and elements involved in these claims involve strict and
exact questions of patent validity, a subject matter reserved solely for the
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has the optimum capability to
balance the importance of patents with the importance of antitrust
liability related to the fraud involved in the procurement of patents
according to the Supreme Court’s holding in Walker Process.
The use of the courts to enforce invalid patents is known as sham
litigation. The Supreme Court, in PRE, adopted a two-part test to
determine whether an intellectual property owner has engaged in sham
litigation to enforce his or her rights.149 A sham litigation claim requires
an antitrust plaintiff to plead and prove that the infringement suit was
objectively baseless at the time the lawsuit was filed.150 Once this
element is pled and proven, the second element requires proof that the
suit was motivated by a subjective intent to abuse the litigation process to
143
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945)).
144
Handgards, 743 F.2d 1282.
145
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 2005).
146
See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
147
See id.
148
SCHNEIDER, supra note 130, at 47.
149
PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
150
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir.
1998); PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61.
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interfere with the business of a competitor, rather than to obtain judicial
relief.151 Once the elements of a sham litigation claim are proven, the
antitrust plaintiff must still prove the traditional section 2 violations of
the Sherman Act. Patent holders who initiate and conduct infringement
actions in bad faith contribute nothing to the furtherance of the policies
of either the patent law or the antitrust law.152 The Federal Circuit
conducts a well-balanced analysis when it addresses the antitrust issues
relating to enforcement of an invalid patent because it is examining
issues of fact and law regarding the validity of patents. Under PRE, the
test for sham litigation involves the determination of whether an
intellectual property owner had probable cause to enforce his or her
patent through the courts or tribunals.153 The Federal Circuit is the best
circuit court to determine whether the alleged sham litigant owns a valid
patent, i.e. the Federal Circuit is in the best position to determine patent
validity. Furthermore, the traditional violations of the Sherman Act are
analyzed under regional circuit law, not Federal Circuit law. It is
certainly within the province of the Federal Circuit to apply its own
analysis and precedent when it addresses the antitrust issues solely
relating to patent invalidity.
When the Federal Circuit hears antitrust issues relating to patent
enforcement, it appropriately follows the precedent established in Walker
Process and PRE to conduct a proper analysis. Assuming an antitrust
plaintiff can present material issues of fact to show fraud on the PTO
(Walker Process claim), or that the defendant filed an objectively
baseless suit coupled with improper subjective motivation for bringing
the claim (sham litigation claim), an antitrust plaintiff must plead and
prove the traditional elements of an antitrust violation. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States.”154 An antitrust plaintiff thus must prove the following elements:
(1) a relevant market, (2) that the defendant (infringement plaintiff) “has
151
PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
152
See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984). Handgards
was the first case to address sham litigation in the patent context. Handgards, Inc.
(“Handgards”) filed an antitrust claim against Ethicon, Inc. (“Ethicon”) for initiating and
pursuing a series of bad faith patent infringement suits in an attempt to monopolize the
heat-sealed plastic gloves market sold in home hair coloring kits. Id. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that “such actions may constitute an attempt to
monopolize violative of Section 2 of the antitrust law.” Id. The use of the courts to
eliminate competition in a relevant market became known as a Handgards or sham
litigation claim.
153
PRE, 508 U.S. at 62.
154
15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 2005).
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engaged in predatory or [otherwise] anticompetitive conduct,” (3) that
the defendant (infringement plaintiff) specifically intended to acquire
monopoly power within the relevant market, and (4) that defendant
(infringement plaintiff) has reached a dangerous probability that the
attempt would be successful in achieving a monopoly in the relevant
market.155
Proponents of the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II decision might critique
the Federal Circuit’s Xerox analysis as being too protective of patent
holders which may thus deter innovation by subsequent innovators.
However, the Federal Circuit has not always protected patentees and has
upheld district court decisions to strip patent holders of their rights,
exposing them to antitrust violations. In Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v.
Swift Eckrich, Inc. (“Unitherm”)156, the Federal Circuit did not find in
favor of the patentee when it determined whether the patentee was
immune from charges of an antitrust violation, contrary to the view that
the court is too pro-patent to be objectively neutral in deciding where
patent rights end and antitrust law begins. The court recognized that the
immunity from antitrust liability enjoyed by a patentee may be lost if
fraud in obtaining or enforcing the patent is shown under Walker
Process. In Unitherm, the plaintiff, Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.
(“Unitherm”) sought declaration that the defendant, Swift Eckrich, Inc.’s
(“Swift”) patent was invalid and further asserted monopolization and
tortious interference claims.157 The court affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment that Swift’s patent was invalid and unenforceable for
prior use and prior sale under § 102(b).158 The Federal Circuit found
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the patentee knew of
the prior use and thus obtained the patent through fraud on the Patent and
Trademark Office. The court upheld the jury verdict stripping Swift of
the antitrust immunity afforded patent holders. The Federal Circuit
applied the Tenth Circuit’s Sherman Act analysis, however it held that
the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide the plaintiff’s
antitrust claims because the plaintiff failed to provide adequate economic
evidence of the relevant market.159
155
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Unitherm based its antitrust allegations on a Walker Process claim.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Walker Process, the enforcement
of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office “may
be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements
necessary to a § 2 case are present.”160 In such event the treble damage
provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act would be available to an injured
party.161 Once the court determined the patent was procured by fraud, it
proceeded with the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Walker
Process. The court considered the exclusionary power of an illegal patent
claim with respect to the relevant market for the product involved.162 The
Federal Circuit stated that a Walker Process antitrust analysis can be
framed by whether: (1) the patentee attempted to enforce the patent at
issue; (2) the patent fraudulently issued; (3) the Walker Process claimant
had antitrust standing (i.e., suffered antitrust damages); (4) the
“attempted enforcement threatened to lessen competition in a relevant
antitrust market;” and (5) “all other elements of attempted
monopolization are met.”163 The court cited Nobelpharma and stated
that the question of whether the Walker Process elements have been
shown for purposes of stripping a patentee of its antitrust immunity must
be decided under Federal Circuit law.164 The court added that the law of
the regional circuit is applied to the elements of antitrust claims that are
not unique to patent law, such as antitrust standing, market definition,
antitrust injury and damages.165 The court stated that the Federal Circuit
is “in the best position to impose uniformity on the patent laws” and
decided the issues raised in the antitrust claim that were unique to the
patent law under Federal Circuit law.166 Therefore, in determining
whether the patentee attempted to enforce the patent at issue and whether
the patent fraudulently issued, Federal Circuit law is applied and the law
of the regional circuit, the Tenth Circuit in this case, is to be applied
when determining whether the claimant had antitrust standing, the
attempted enforcement threatened to lessen competition in the relevant

160
Id. at 1347 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 174 (1965)).
161
15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 2005).
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Id. at 1355.
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antitrust market, and whether the remaining elements of attempted
monopolization are met.167
Unitherm is yet another case that demonstrates how the Federal
Circuit does not take a grudging view of antitrust principles and does not
have a broad view of patentees’ rights to enforce and refuse to license
their patents. The decision displays the Federal Circuit’s ability to strike
the correct balance of the relationship of antitrust to intellectual property
law. The court did not protect the patent holder from antitrust liability
and found that the patent holder was enforcing an invalid patent. The
Federal Circuit sustained the antitrust verdict by applying its
Nobelpharma rule when it analyzed the elements of a Walker Process
claim and applied the Tenth Circuit’s antitrust law to analyze the
elements of a Section 2 violation. Thus, the court did not apply its own
antitrust law, but instead applied the law of the regional circuit to find
167
Id. The court held that even though the Walker Process claim was raised by
Unitherm as ancillary to the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action, rather than as a
counterclaim to an allegation of patent infringement, the defendant had attempted to
enforce its patent. Id. at 1357 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965)). In analyzing fraudulent issuance, the Federal
Circuit held clear and convincing evidence supported the jury’s finding of material
misrepresentation and intent to deceive. Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1360. The court utilized
concepts of common law fraud and first considered that the patent applicant attested to
his inventorship when he signed the required inventor’s declaration and then assigned the
resulting patent to the defendant (invoking agency principles of liability). Id. Next, the
court considered that both the patent’s named inventor and assignee knew of the prior use
and public sale of the invention four years before the critical date. Id. at 1359. The
Federal Circuit found antitrust standing, in part, because of Swift’s illegal enforcement of
its patent and its fraudulent conduct in procuring the patent. Id. at 1362. The court
utilized the Tenth Circuit’s rule in determining whether Unitherm possessed antitrust
standing. The Tenth Circuit defines antitrust injury as “an injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts
unlawful. . . . Factors to consider in evaluating antitrust standing include: (1) the causal
connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the harm; (2) improper motive or
intent of defendants; (3) whether the claimed injury is one sought to be redressed by
antitrust damages; (4) the directness between the injury and the market restraint resulting
from the alleged violation; (5) the speculative nature of the damages claimed; and (6) the
risk of duplicative recoveries or complex damage apportionment.” Id. at 1362 (citing
Sports Racing Servs. v. Sports Car Club of Am., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir.1997))
(internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 1245, 1252 (10th Cir. 2003); Indium Corp. of Am. v. SemiAlloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The court then questioned whether
Unitherm presented evidence that could support its definition of the relevant market.
Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1363-64. The Federal Circuit held that under Tenth Circuit law,
the relevant product market hinges on economic evidence of reasonable
interchangeability. Id. Unitherm only offered evidence of technical interchangeability,
and not evidence of economic interchangeability, thus the Court ruled that the antitrust
claims should never have made it to the jury and vacated the jury’s findings regarding the
relevant market. The court also applied Tenth Circuit law to determine whether or not the
defendant had preserved its right to appeal. Id. at 1365.
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that the patentee was liable under the Sherman Act. This case further
proves that the Federal Circuit is not biased toward patent owners and
instead has been able to reconcile the tensions between antitrust and
intellectual property laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is an inherent tension existing between the assertion of patent
rights and the restraints that antitrust imposes on any bundle of patent
rights. It is unknown whether the debate between the two paradigms will
settle, however allocating antitrust issues as they relate to patent issues to
the Federal Circuit represents a warm turn toward a well-balanced
compromise. Indeed, former chairman Pitfosky made a positive point in
his speech to the American Antitrust Institute when he addressed the
dividing line between patent rights and antitrust restraints. He stated that
over the last century, antitrust and intellectual property are:
[C]omplementary regimes, both designed to encourage
innovation within appropriate limits. As a matter of policy, we
are comfortable rewarding innovation through patents and
copyrights so long as the compensation is not significantly in
excess of that necessary to encourage investment in innovation,
and the market power that results is not used to distort
competition.168

The recent Federal Circuit decisions certainly attempt to develop uniform
principles to govern the relationship between patent rights and antitrust
restraints instead of looking to antitrust precedents in the appropriate
regional circuits. The Federal Circuit has done this in a way that properly
balances the necessary encouragement of innovation with the need to
prevent the impairment of competition and provides clarity to the
principles of antitrust laws involving patent enforcement issues. As one
commentator noted, “rather than siblings sharing a room, the two bodies
of law are more like parents running a household. As with parents
looking out for the best interest of the children, the guiding principle is
the best interest of consumers.”169 Intellectual property owners should be
rightfully entitled to claim the full scope of their property grant, and any
activity within the scope of that grant should be permissible. The
Federal Circuit recognizes the common goals of antitrust law and
168
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Common Goals and Uncommon Problems (Oct. 12, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov
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intellectual property law and is thus able to appropriately balance
between the two regimes when it is faced with antitrust counterattacks in
the patent infringement context.

